The theoretical basis for measuring child costs is discussed, and detailed consideration is given to two straightforward procedures for calculation, Engel's food share method and Rothbarth's adult good method. Each of these methods embodies different definitions of child costs so that the same empirical evidence can generate quite different estimates depending on the method used. It is shown that true costs are generally overstated by Engel's method and understated by Rothbarth's procedure, although the latter, unlike the former, can provide a sensible starting point for cost measurement. Our estimates from Sri Lankan and Indonesian data suggest that children cost their parents about 30-40 percent of what they spend on themselves.
surprisingly little overlap between the two strands, and few papers are cited in both. Although we believe that the approach followed in much of the demographic literature lacks a rigorous theoretical foundation, it contains a number of important insights that have to some extent been lost sight of in the economics literature. For example, in Dublin and Lotka (1930; 2d ed. 1946 ), the authors attempt, for actuarial purposes, to estimate the "money value of a man" net of input costs, that is, the costs of bringing the individual to maturity. Dublin and Lotka measure these costs in an apparently straightforward way, beginning appropriately enough with the "costs of being born" (1946, p. 45), estimated in 1946 prices at $185-$200 for a typical family of moderate means. A more modern version of the same procedure uses regression analysis to estimate the additional expenditures associated with various classes of children so that simple addition can be used to measure total costs (see Lindert 1978 Lindert , 1980 ). While we shall argue that these simple procedures are not appropriate without a clearer idea of the concepts involved, Dublin and Lotka's costs of being born are clearly a legitimate part of any sensible definition of child costs so that this example provides an excellent touchstone for assessing other, more complex methods.
There are immediate practical difficulties with simple schemes that add up the additional costs associated with children. In particular, unless a newborn child comes with an endowment, household resources are the same after the event as they were before it. Additional expenditures associated with the child must therefore be met by adjustments elsewhere, for example, by cutting other current or future expenditures or leisure. In consequence, the sum of all additional outlays, negative and positive, must be zero unless we are given prior information about which (positive) expenditures to count and which (negative) ones to ignore. More fundamentally, the notion of child costs implies a potential compensation that will restore some measure of welfare to its level prior to the existence of the child. If this welfare measure is not made explicit, we cannot tell whether or not any given formula for calculating the compensation makes sense.
The economic approach to child costs makes a better start in this direction if only because it is usually accompanied by writing down a utility function that can be used as the basis for index number or consumer surplus comparisons of situations with different demographics. For example, suppose that the welfare of the parents is given by u = v(q, a),
where q is a vector of household consumption levels and a is a vector of demographic characteristics, for example, the number of persons in each age and sex category. Note the focus on parental utility: the parents are assumed to be the decision makers, and in addition they are the only people who are present both before and after the arrival of the children. For the moment, the arguments of equation (1) require little discussion; the model is consistent with parents' obtaining utility from their children as well as from their own and their children's consumption. Associated with (1) is a cost or expenditure function c(u, p, a) that gives the minimum expenditure necessary to attain utility u at prices p and composition a so that, if uR and PR are some reference utility level and price vector, the additional cost of a' over ao is given, as in consumer surplus calculations, by C = C(UR, pR, a') -c(UR pR a0).
Alternatively, an index number methodology can be used, in which case the relative costs are expressed as a ratio, or equivalence scale, E = c(uR, PR al)
Note that, in both measures, utility is held constant across the comparison, though in general both the scale and the cost measure will be functions of both the reference utility level and the price vector. The parental preferences given by the utility function (1) or the cost function will generate a corresponding system of demand functions that relates observed expenditures on goods to income, prices, and demographic characteristics. Estimation of this system yields information about the preference parameters and thus holds out the hope of identifying the cost or scale measures (2) and (3). However, as first pointed out by Pollak and Wales (1979) , knowledge of the system of demand functions for commodities (including, in principle, leisure and saving) is not sufficient to identify the child cost measures. For a similar point in the context of taste and quality change, see Fisher and Shell (1971) and Muellbauer (1975) . The problem lies in the treatment of the demographic characteristics as fixed "modifiers" of preferences rather than as choice variables in their own right. In standard index number or consumer surplus theory, costs of two situations are compared with reference to a fixed indifference curve, and the labeling of this indifference curve is of no consequence for the measurement. In other words, monotonic increasing transformations of the utility function affect neither the observable demands nor the calculation of compensations. However, in the current case, any function of u in (1) that also involves the vector of demographics, a, while leaving the observable demand functions unchanged, will generally affect the compensations calculated by (2) or (3). Such transformations relabel indifference curves in a way that depends on the demographic com-position of the household so that the presence of an additional child might, for example, make the parents better off without in any way changing their behavior. The obvious possibility is that, when they have children, parents may feel much happier in a way that has nothing to do with their consumption pattern.
Formally, if we define 0(u, a) as some function that is increasing in its first argument, then the cost function
generates demand functions linking purchases to incomes, prices, and demographics that are unaffected by the choice of function 0. As a consequence, any parameters in the function 0 cannot be recovered from empirical observation of these demand functions, and the cost measures are therefore not identifiable from such observation. To make progress, we must either find some other way of estimating 0 or else construct a procedure that is defensible for any 0 function. One possible procedure is to treat the demand for children symmetrically with the demand for other goods so that fertility equations are estimated jointly with commodity demand, savings, and labor supply equations. There are obvious problems in measuring appropriate "prices" for children, but if these can be overcome, the problem discussed above no longer exists and index numbers and consumer surplus calculations can be carried out in the standard way. Parents' attitudes toward children are revealed by their fertility behavior, and their trade-offs between goods and children by their joint selection of goods and children in response to changes in prices and incomes. We have doubts whether the economic theory of fertility is sufficiently well developed at an empirical level to make such an exercise feasible, but, more important, we do not believe that such models are appropriate for the concept of child costs that we are trying to measure. If we suppose that most parents are parents because they want to have children, then the compensation that would have to be paid to restore them to their utility level prior to the birth of the child would be negative since they are now better off than they were before. But this is simply not relevant to the problem of measuring the costs of the upkeep of the child, the costs of being born, or the costs of food and education. That parents choose to have children means that the benefits of having them are greater than the costs, but it does not mean that the costs are zero.
What is required is a narrower and more purely economic definition of parental welfare, and one that excludes the benefits of the children themselves, whether real or psychological. For an individual, it is usual to think of economic well-being as directly related to the individual's level of expenditure, as given, for example, by the indirect utility function. If it were possible to separate the household accounts into expenditures attributable to adults and children separately, then a measure of the level of living of the adults could be constructed based on the adults' expenditure level. Unfortunately, the data do not come in such a form, and, at a conceptual level, there are formidable difficulties in dealing with shared or household "public goods." It is therefore necessary to define some alternative protocol for measuring the economic welfare of the adults, and all the standard economic methods for measuring child costs do so in one way or another, although not always explicitly. Once done, a procedure is thereby defined whereby it is possible to detect whether welfare is higher or lower in any two real or hypothetical situations so that it is possible to calculate a compensation that will equalize parental welfare before and after a change in household composition, thus establishing its cost. Much of Section III below is concerned with making explicit the welfare definitions implied by the standard procedures, discussing their reasonableness, and drawing out the consequences of using them.
In the rest of this paper we shall confine ourselves to measures of child costs that can be estimated from a single household expenditure survey. This prevents us from discussing issues that arise when prices vary, and some of the more elaborate models of child costs require price variation to identify their parameters. However, one of our main concerns is with schemes that are straightforward to implement and that require only data that are likely to be widely available. The two methods we discuss are really the only serious contenders for such situations, and we believe that much can be learned from studying them. However, these practical limitations limit our analysis to short-run measures of child costs and parental welfare. It would be an important and rewarding exercise to follow households through the life cycle and perhaps to treat children as investment goods, with costs in terms of goods and time (leisure forgone) when the parents and children are young and with a reversal (at least as insurance) when the children are older. It is easy to imagine that the net costs over the life cycle to the parents could be very different from the short-run costs that are inferred from studying household budgets, the costs of being born for those with very young children, or the costs of education that are borne by parents with college-age offspring. Although we confine ourselves to the short-run costs and we make no attempt to allow for time costs, we recognize the existence and importance of the wider concepts as well as the substantial literature that exists on examining the interactions between children, time, and work effort (see, e.g., Gronau 1974; Heckman 1974). We also believe that the general framework laid out above could be straightforwardly adapted to deal with life-cycle considerations.
III. Engel and Rothbarth Estimates of Child Costs

A. Engel
Engel's (1895) method rests on the supposition that the standard of living of adults is correctly indicated by the share of the household budget devoted to food. Given this, the cost of a newborn child can straightforwardly be measured by calculating the compensation that would have to be paid to the parents to restore the household food share to its prenatal level. We shall give examples of the calculations below, but we first consider the basis for the central identifying assumption, that the adults in two households with different numbers or ages of children are equally well off if the households have the same food share.
The plausibility of the Engel assumption seems to be based on empirical evidence that (a) for households of the same demographic composition, the food share varies inversely with income or total expenditure ( 
where a' corresponds to ao plus an extra child. The inequality asserts that a household that has been fully compensated for the costs of an additional child has a higher food share than it did prior to the child's arrival. It can be derived from a number of more primitive assumptions and rests fundamentally on the share of food in child costs being relatively large and on the presence of the child not causing its parents to consume sufficiently less food to offset the child's own demands. The Engel procedure gives the parents u*, defined by 4,(u*, p, a') = 4,(u0, p, a0) 
where nj is the number of persons in categoryJ (j = 1,... ,J), n is the total number of people in the household, x is total expenditure, E is a random error, and ot, P, and -y are parameters. For many of the household surveys from the Third World that we have examined, it is the case that the per capita term ln(x/n) provides a high degree of the explained variation and that, by comparison, the My parameters are typically estimated to be rather small. A similar result is reported for data from the United States by Espenshade (1984) . In practice, the fit of the equation is often improved by the inclusion of a term that is quadratic in ln(x/n). For simplicity of presentation we shall continue to work with (8), although the child costs that we present in tables 1 and 2 below are calculated on the basis of the quadratic regressions.
A full discussion of the application of (8) 1270. For this survey we distinguish ncl and nc2, the numbers of small children (c 5 years old) and large children (> 5 years). As in the Sri Lankan case, the two categories could have been combined without significant loss of fit, but retaining the split is useful for reasons that will appear below. Although we confine ourselves to these two equations, we believe that they are not atypical of food share equations from household surveys in poor countries. In particular, the range of the coefficients on ln(x/n) shown here, from -.1 to -.2, covers most of the estimates of which we are aware.
The general procedure for converting Engel curve estimates into child cost measures is illustrated in figure 1. At some essentially arbitrary food share w>, X0 and x* are the budgets that would cause the reference and large households to have the same food share and thus the same welfare level. The difference (x* -xo) is the additional expenditure required by the larger household and is thus the measure of child costs. The equivalence scale is simply the ratio xl/x0. Note that both the cost measure and the scale will generally be different for different values of w0; this is quite acceptable since costs may well be different at different levels of the budget. For the specific Engel curves given by (8), define x* as the outlay required by household h to reach the same welfare level as the reference h = 0 with xo and ao. When the food shares are equal, x* is defined by Table 1 gives the estimated Engel scales using the parameters from the quadratic version of (8) and calculated at the mean of total expenditure. The reference household is one that contains two adults so that the Sri Lankan figures give one child as costing 82 percent of an adult and two children as 77 percent each. The numbers for small children in Indonesia are very similar, but now the large children apparently cost more than an adult. This, of course, is a consequence of the positive coefficient on the large children in (10), and since this is not significantly greater than zero, neither are the estimated child costs significantly greater than the adult costs. But all the figures in the table are implausibly large and would be so even for a developed country, let alone poor countries like Sri Lanka and Indonesia.
These figures undoubtedly depend to some extent on our choice of functional form. However, the results follow from our finding that the food share depends, to a first order of approximation, on per capita income or expenditure, and this finding does not seem to be special to our data or to our functional form. But we also expected the Engel scales to be too large on theoretical grounds. As we argued above, there is no convincing basis for the crucial assumption that the food share correctly indicates adult welfare, and we showed that the use of the assumption will lead to estimates of child costs that are too large. 
B. Rothbarth
Rothbarth identified his estimate of child costs by prior selection of a group of adult goods, the total expenditure on which correctly indicates adult welfare. The presence of children is assumed to affect the total expenditure on adult goods only through income-like effects so that, if the correct compensation for child costs were to be paid, expenditure on adult goods would be unaltered by changes in the number of children. Hence, while the Engel method works by calculating the amount of money that would restore the food share to its previous level, the Rothbarth method calculates the sum of money that would restore the level of expenditure on adult goods. Rothbarth himself used a very broad definition of adult goods including virtually all luxury goods as well as saving. Later authors have tended to work with narrow groupings, most popularly with drink and tobacco. As pointed out by Cramer (1969), this can cause problems since neither category seems to be typically very responsive to changes in income so that the income effects required to measure the compensation are hard to establish. For the moment, we postpone the issue and assume that we have a two-way grouping of commodities into adult goods (A goods) and other goods (B goods). Note that it is not assumed that the B goods are child goods. These are all the goods that are not pure adult goods, and though pure child goods are included, so are goods consumed by both as well as public goods that are jointly consumed. As is the case for the Engel procedure, the assumption that identifies welfare is an untestable or identifying assumption that allows us to interpret behavior but places no restriction on its form. Of course, if it is assumed that there are many adult goods, all of which are affected by changes in the numbers and ages of children as if by income changes, then the appropriate restrictions can be tested.
Deaton, Ruiz-Castillo, and Thomas (1985) show how this can be done and obtain reasonably positive results using a Spanish household survey. However, the general proposition that total expenditure on adult goods correctly indicates adult welfare cannot be tested empirically and can only be justified on a priori grounds. As we have already argued, total household expenditure attributable to the adults would be a sensible (and narrow) measure of the adults' standard of living, and one that is in line with the standard economic practice of measuring living standards in terms of real income. The question is then whether the part of this total that is clearly attributable to adults only is itself a sensible measure of welfare. If the parents' preferences are separable between their own consumption and that of their children, there will exist subgroup demand functions that relate the consumption of each adult good to total adult expenditure and to the prices of all goods consumed by the adults (some of which are also consumed by their children). As we shall see below, it can be argued that the presence of children may well alter the effective prices of adult goods, but if this effect is either absent or unimportant, Rothbarth's procedure for indicating the total by one of its parts will be valid, at least if the prespecified adult goods are normal goods.
This argument seems to us to be reasonably convincing and is much more satisfactory than any corresponding justification that can be created for the Engel assumption that the food share indicates adult welfare. Even so, the supposition that children do not alter relative prices can be challenged in terms of Barten's (1964) or Gorman's (1976) model of demographic effects (see also Pollak and Wales 1981). In these, the presence of children makes goods that are shared with children relatively more expensive than pure adult goods-"a penny bun costs three pence when you have a wife and child"-so that there may be substitution toward adult goods in households with children. It is far from established that the effects of children work this way (see, e.g., Muellbauer 1977), but if they do, the Rothbarth measure of costs will be too small. A household that is perfectly compensated for the costs associated with the arrival of a child will display greater consumption of pure adult goods than before the event. The Rothbarth procedure will pay compensation only to the point where consumption of pure adult goods is unchanged, which is not enough. These arguments suggest that the Rothbarth method should be used with circumspection when the presence of children is likely to cause substitution toward what appears to be a purely adult good. For example, children rarely listen to recordings of Bartok string quartets, but the parents might be induced to increase this activity by the presence of children, either for its soothing effects or because it is now more difficult and expensive to attend live concerts. Other examples can readily be imagined.
The Rothbarth procedure is applied in very much the same way as the Engel procedure. An Engel curve is established for the total of adult goods, and its slope is used to calculate the income that would be required to nullify the negative effects of additional children on the total. Note that children need not be homogeneous but can readily be distinguished by sex and age. Indeed, the Rothbarth model would seem to be a good candidate to use in the investigation of "sex bias" in family consumption (see Sen [1984] for some evidence). If parents treat female children less generously, the presence of female children should have less effect on adult consumption than the presence of their male siblings.
Finally, we note that in a recent paper, Gronau (1985) , while endorsing the Rothbarth model in principle, has pointed out that, if parents derive utility from the consumption of their offspring, their marginal propensities to spend on purely adult goods are likely to be reduced by the presence of additional children. If the Engel curve slopes are affected in this way and if the phenomenon is ignored, then the calculated Rothbarth costs will be too small since, with a reduced propensity to spend, larger compensations must be paid to restore any given level of adult expenditure.
C. Engel versus Rothbarth
We have argued that the Engel measure of child costs is likely to be too large and the Rothbarth measure too small. Indeed, with some further assumptions, it is possible to prove inequalities between them. In particular, we examine the consequences of applying the Rothbarth procedure under the assumption that all nonfood is an adult good. This is an extreme assumption made in order to allow us to obtain sharp results; it may also be a reasonable approximation for very poor families.
The following is true: if (a) the B goods (nonadult goods) in the Rothbarth model correspond to food in the Engel model and (b) the B goods (i.e., foods) are necessities, then the Rothbarth scale is no larger than the Engel scale. Note that the same empirical evidence is used for both calculations; the inconsistency between the estimates is entirely due to assumption and not to measurement. The argument is straightforward. If, when a child is born, the parents are compensated according to Rothbarth, their nonfood expenditure is unchanged after the child's arrival. But their total expenditure has increased; hence the share of nonfood has risen. Hence, according to S, x must be increased to XR for the larger household to reestablish the base level of nonfood q2, while to reach the same share pattern as 0, that is, along the ray OS, total outlays must be increased to xE. Although the identification of nonadult goods with food is clearly extreme, it is clear that the assumption is not necessary for the result. In particular, the crucial step in the argument is inequality (14), that the food share be larger after Rothbarth compensation has been paid, and it is likely that this will be true for most plausible definitions of adult goods.
Under the assumption that nonfood is the adult good, we have calculated the Rothbarth scales using the estimated Engel curves for Sri Lanka and Indonesia that were given in Section IIIB, again with the quadratic terms added. The food Engel curve (8) that actually reaches the parents when an amount qi is purchased for the family as a whole. The quantity mi(a) is therefore unity if children do not consume the good, it would be two if children get the same as adults, and so on. Note that this interpretation differs from the usual one in which (16) , pim1(a), p2m2(a), . . ., p,,m,(a) ].
The important features of (17) and (18) 
where the n's are fixed costs associated with the demographic vector a. For the reference household, without children, all n's are zero just as all m's are unity. Note that, with all mr's unity but nonzero n's, the Rothbarth procedure is correct provided that goods with zero n's are taken to be the pure adult goods. Consider the application of the Rothbarth and Engel procedures to a two-good food/nonfood model when the Gorman-Barten model is in fact correct. Let good 1 be food and good 2 be nonfood, with the latter (falsely) taken to be the adult good in the Rothbarth procedure. To get sharp results, we make some plausible assumptions: (i) ml -1, m2 : 1, and MI/m2 ? 1; that is, children consume both goods but have a relatively heavy food requirement. (ii) Good 1 is a necessity, and its compensated own-price elasticity is less than unity in absolute value. (iii) For any utility level u and prices pi and P2 the effect of more children on the fixed costs n, and n2 is to increase the food share. We state this more precisely later but note that the assumption will be satisfied if nI > 0 and n2 = 0.
We write the derivatives of the first term on the right-hand side of (19) as m1 ( In other words, children are relatively food intensive in the fixed costs, n, as well as in the "scaling" coefficients m. Given the three assumptions, it is now straightforward to show that the true equivalence scale, E, say, lies between the Rothbarth and Engel scales. Consider first the case in which the Engel compensation is paid for a change from a0, the reference demographic vector, to al where al contains more children than a0 does. Let the reference utility level be uo and the utility level of h after receiving the payment be uE. We show that uE is greater than uo, that is, that the household has been 
The share functions are homogeneous of degree zero in the prices so that the right-hand side of (23) 
IV. Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations
In the previous section we discussed in some detail the foundations of two leading methods for calculating child costs, and we compared them with a much more general model. We argued that the Engel model is likely to overstate child costs and the Rothbarth model to understate them. Indeed, if the true technology of child costs can be represented by Barten's model as modified by Gorman, then, under plausible assumptions, the correct measure can be shown to lie between the Rothbarth and Engel measures. In practical applications, however, it will always be extremely difficult to estimate the parameters of the Gorman-Barten model, and the Rothbarth and Engel methods are likely to have continued popularity, if only on computational grounds. It is therefore important to try to assess which, if either, is likely to give a satisfactory approximation.
From the discussion in Section I1D, it is easily checked that the following are true: (a) The Rothbarth model gives the correct answer if (i) n2 = 0 and M2 = 1 so that there are no fixed costs for the adult (nonfood) good, and (ii) children exert no pricelike substitution effects between the two goods. Condition ii requires either that the Barten-type effects be absent altogether (i.e., ml = 1) or that there be a zero elasticity of substitution between adult and child goods. (b) If there are no fixed costs, the Engel method will give the correct answer if either ml = M2, so that there are no child-induced substitution effects, or the compensated price elasticity for good 1 (food) is (minus) unity. With mI/m2 > 1 and with the demand for food price inelastic, the Engel method can be correct only if the fixed child costs for good 2 are larger than those for good 1.
The conditions in b make little sense, and none of them is likely to be satisfied. Conditions a are more plausible, at least in certain contexts. In particular, for poor households close to subsistence, the compensated price elasticity of food as a whole is likely to be very close to zero. The condition that there be no child fixed costs or scaling factors for the adult good simply requires that the adult good be correctly identified as such. However, in our food/nonfood applications above, there are presumably some child requirements for nonfood items, for example, clothing. Nevertheless, it may be possible to deal with this by a correction to the Rothbarth scale if the latter is not too far out. Equation (27) where e2 is the total expenditure elasticity of good 2, e22 is its compensated price elasticity, E is the true scale, and ER is the Rothbarth scale. As argued, we can assume the price elasticity to be very small for consumers close to subsistence. The expenditure elasticity can be directly estimated and is typically around two for the surveys used above. The expression m2 -1 + (n2/q2) is the amount of nonfood that is "diverted" from adult to child use. If we take a generous view, we might assume that each child gets half as much of good 2 as he would were he an adult. This would mean that one child with two parents would account for one-fifth of nonfood expenditure, and two children with two parents would account for one-quarter. The corresponding corrections to the Rothbarth scales would then be .10 and .125. Applying these to table 2 would suggest that child costs are 30-40 percent of expenditure per adult, figures that seem to us to be both appropriate and defensible. Note too that these are estimates for Sri Lanka and Indonesia or for countries at similar levels of development, and such corrections to food-based measures would not be appropriate for developed countries where children bring heavy nonfood expenditures. We have also made no allowance for the consequences of children on adult leisure, and though such effects are probably quite limited in poor countries, they are likely to be of major significance in countries such as the United States. However, our conclusion that the Engel method is not well based applies in general, and the Rothbarth method with corrections for substitution effects is much to be preferred in any context. We can construct no plausible defense for the belief that the food share correctly indicates welfare between households of different size, and we do not believe that credence should be given to estimates based on that belief.
We conclude with a warning about the possible misuse of the sort of measures we have calculated in this paper. One major use of equivalence scales is to make comparisons of welfare between households of different sizes. But ultimately, welfare comparisons must be based on the welfare levels of individuals, not of households. The measures in this paper tell us about the effects of children on adult welfare, but they do not tell us about the welfare levels of the children themselves. Indeed, we doubt that household expenditure data in anything like their traditional form can tell us very much about the relative welfare levels of adults and children. One possible assumption is that everyone in the household shares the same welfare level, and this would enable comparisons of welfare or inequality with individuals as the basis of analysis. However, there are cases in which such an assumption would be clearly inappropriate, for example, in societies in which women and children are treated as the chattels of a dominant male. In such a society, it might be argued that only adults or only males should count in analyzing welfare. We cannot resolve such issues here, and we are concerned only to point out that the results given above do not attempt to do so.
